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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Beazer East, Inc. ("Beazer"), appeals an 
order of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania dismissing Beazer's claims for indemnity 
and contribution.  Beazer claimed appellee, The Mead Corporation 
("Mead"), was bound by a promise to pay Beazer all or part of 
Beazer's response costs on a Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601-9675 (West 
1983 & Supp. 1994) ("CERCLA"), cleanup of a site Beazer's 
predecessor had acquired from Mead's predecessor.  Instead, the 
  
district court granted summary judgment to Mead on Mead's 
counterclaim for indemnity from Beazer against Mead's response 
costs.  In doing so, the district court adopted a United States 
Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation ("Magistrate Judge's 
Report").  The magistrate judge had concluded that Mead was a 
responsible party for purposes of CERCLA but that the asset 
purchase agreement ("Agreement") under which Beazer had acquired 
the site of the contaminated facility, the Woodward Facility Coke 
Plant (the "Woodward Facility" or "Coke Plant"), required Beazer 
to indemnify Mead against CERCLA liability.  The magistrate judge 
reasoned that a provision for indemnification in a contract that 
predates CERCLA's enactment will govern the responsibility of the 
contracting parties inter se for payment of CERCLA cleanup costs 
if the indemnification or release provision is a general release 
from all liability arising out of a particular transfer or 
contains an unambiguous promise to indemnify against all 
liabilities that environmental law, present or future, may impose 
because of pollutants on the property transferred.  The 
magistrate judge then concluded that the asset purchase agreement 
between Mead's predecessor, the seller, and Beazer's predecessor, 
the buyer of the contaminated site, unambiguously required Beazer 
to indemnify Mead against any liability for injury to the 
environment from substances on the property, including cleanup 
under CERCLA, no matter who polluted the site.  The paragraph in 
question, Paragraph 4(c) of the agreement, required the buyer and 
its successors to assume and perform "[o]bligations of the Coke 
Plant to comply from and after the Closing Date with all of the 
  
terms and conditions of any . . .  solid waste disposal permit, 
license or order, hereafter issued by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency . . . in accordance with 
applications now pending and listed in Exhibit F hereto."  
Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at 23. 
 On appeal Beazer argues that the district court erred 
in concluding this indemnity provision was unambiguously broad 
enough to impose on it a general duty to indemnify Mead against 
all environmental liability under either state or federal common 
law concerning the construction of such contracts of indemnity. 
 We agree with the magistrate judge and the district 
court concerning the substance if not the source of the standard 
that must be used in determining the effect of an indemnity 
clause on a party's liability under laws subsequently enacted to 
protect the environment.  We part ways with the magistrate judge 
and the district court, however, in the application of this 
standard to the provision at hand.  We agree with Beazer that 
Paragraph 4(c) of this agreement does not plainly and 
unambiguously require it to indemnify Mead for cleanup costs at 
the Coke Plant, and therefore reverse the order of the district 
court granting Mead summary judgment, vacate the order which 
dismisses Beazer's claim for contribution and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On remand the district 
court will have to consider both parties' contribution claims, 
and determine the proper apportionment of CERCLA liability. 
 
 I.  Factual & Procedural History 
  
 Mead's predecessor, the Woodward Corporation, operated 
the Woodward Facility as a coke and coke-by products 
manufacturing facility from 1905 until 1968.  In 1968, the 
Woodward Iron Company merged with Mead.  Mead, in turn, operated 
the Coke Plant until 1974, when it sold the facility and 
surrounding land to Beazer's predecessor, Koppers Company, Inc. 
("KCI").  KCI purchased the Coke Plant under the Agreement in 
question.  Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides that KCI, as 
buyer, or its successors, will assume certain agreements and 
liabilities.  It reads: 
 As of the Closing Date, Buyer shall assume 
and agree to perform: 
 
  a. . . . all other commitments, 
liabilities and obligations expressly assumed 
by Buyer pursuant to this Purchase Agreement. 
 
 *  *  * 
 
  c. Obligations of the Coke Plant to 
comply from and after the Closing Date with 
all of the terms and conditions of any NPDES 
permit issued by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency or the then 
permitting authority, any permit or order 
issued by the Alabama Water Improvement 
Commission and the Alabama Air Pollution 
Control Commission of the State of Alabama or 
any successor authority, any license, permit 
or order issued by the Jefferson County 
Department of Health, and of any other 
wastewater or runoff water discharge permit, 
license or order, air pollution permit, 
license or order, solid waste disposal 
permit, license or order, hereafter issued by 
the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency and/or by the State of Alabama and/or 
any of its political subdivisions, all in 
accordance with applications now pending and 
listed on Exhibit F hereto. 
 
  
 
App. at 22-23.  Exhibit F contains a "List of Environmental 
Applications and Permits."  It is divided into two parts, one for 
permits related to air and one for permits related to water.  
Exhibit F lists no permits related to solid waste.  All the 
listed permits refer to their date of issuance and the issuing 
authority. 
 Paragraph 8(a) of the Agreement requires Mead, the 
seller, to indemnify Beazer, the buyer, against certain other 
liabilities.  It provides: 
  a. Indemnity Against Unassumed 
Liabilities.  Mead hereby indemnifies Buyer 
against and hereby agrees to hold Buyer 
harmless from and to reimburse Buyer for any 
and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs 
of settlement and expenses . . . which may be 
imposed upon or incurred by Buyer in 
connection with any liabilities or 
obligations of Mead other than those 
expressly assumed by Buyer. 
 
 
App. at 29. 
 Paragraph 8(b), on the other hand, requires Beazer, as 
the buyer's successor, to indemnify Mead, as seller's successor, 
against other liabilities, including whatever liabilities 
paragraph 4(c) imposes on the buyer.  It reads: 
  b. Indemnity Against Assumed 
Liabilities.  Buyer hereby indemnifies Mead 
against and hereby agrees to hold Mead 
harmless from and to reimburse Mead for any 
and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs 
of settlement and expenses . . . which may be 
imposed upon or incurred by Mead in 
connection with any liabilities or 
obligations of Mead and/or the Coke Plant 
assumed by Buyer under this Purchase 
Agreement. 
  
 
 
App. at 30. 
 In 1977, KCI transferred the Coke Plant and surrounding 
land to the Industrial Development Board of the City of 
Fairfield, Alabama ("IDB").  In turn, IDB leased the premises 
back to KCI.  KCI continued to operate the facility.  In 1988, 
Beazer acquired KCI and transferred the lease to a newly created 
corporation, Koppers Industries, Inc. ("KII").  At about this 
same time IDB transferred its ownership interest in the Coke 
Plant and the surrounding land back to KII. 
 In 1981, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") and the Alabama Department of Environmental 
Management began to investigate the Coke Plant site for toxic 
substances.  As a result, EPA asked Beazer to sign an 
Administrative Order on Consent (the "Order") that would require 
Beazer to do a site-wide environmental investigation and 
eventually cleanup the site.  On June 21, 1991, Beazer signed the 
Order.  Issued pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, it 
identifies thirty-nine problem areas at the Coke Plant.  The 
Order calls each of them a "solid waste management unit."  Beazer 
agreed to test each of these units for the presence of toxic 
wastes and then clean them up as necessary. 
 On March 6, 1991, Beazer filed this action.  The 
complaint, following amendment and dismissal of several counts, 
claimed contribution from Mead against any response costs Beazer 
incurred under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f), or 
  
indemnification from Mead based on Paragraph 8(a) of the 
Agreement.  Under the Agreement's indemnification provisions, 
Beazer claimed that the expense of investigating the toxicity of 
these areas and cleaning them up was ultimately Mead's 
responsibility.  Beazer also alleged that many of the solid waste 
management units it agreed to cleanup are parts of the site that 
Mead had dedicated to waste management but Beazer had never 
utilized while it was operating the facility. 
 Mead denied any obligation either to indemnify Beazer 
against these costs or to contribute to the cost of testing, 
investigating or cleaning up the site.  It also asserted a 
counterclaim under Paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement demanding that 
KCI and Beazer, as KCI's successor in interest, indemnify Mead, 
hold it harmless and reimburse it for all response costs that 
investigation and cleanup of toxic wastes deposited on or in the 
Coke Plant or its environs may require.  In another counterclaim, 
Mead asserted, in the alternative, a right to contribution from 
Beazer for any CERCLA costs Mead might be required to pay. 
 Beazer filed a motion for a partial summary judgment 
seeking a declaration that Mead was a responsible operator under 
sections 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA, and that Paragraph 8(a) of 
the Agreement required Mead to indemnify Beazer against liability 
for all response costs.  Mead filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment asserting that Paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement relieved 
it of any obligation to indemnify Beazer or contribute to any 
cleanup costs Beazer might incur, and that Paragraphs 4(c) 
  
and 8(b) combined to obligate Beazer to indemnify Mead against 
any CERCLA response costs Mead might incur. 
 The magistrate judge to whom the district court had 
referred these motions issued a report recommending that Mead be 
held liable as a "responsible party" for any government paid 
response costs, that Mead's cross-motion for summary judgment 
against Beazer be granted and that Beazer's action be dismissed 
in its entirety.  Beazer filed timely objections, but the 
district court adopted the Magistrate's Report as its opinion, 
granted Mead's cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissed 
all of Beazer's claims.  Beazer filed this timely appeal. 
 
  
 II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367 (West 1993) and 
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) (West Supp. 1993).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the district court's final order dismissing 
Beazer's claims and granting Mead's counterclaim under 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court's 
grant of summary judgment.  Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether 
there remain any genuine issues of material fact and, if not, 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  See Bank of Nova Scotia v. Equitable Fin. Management, Inc., 
882 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
 III.  Analysis 
 Section 9607(e)(1) of CERCLA provides: 
 No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar 
agreement or conveyance shall be effective to 
transfer from the owner or operator of any 
vessel or facility or from any person who may 
be liable for a release or threat of release 
under this section, to any other person the 
liability imposed under this section.  
Nothing in this subsection shall bar any 
agreement to insure, hold harmless, or 
indemnify a party to such agreement for any 
liability under this section. 
 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1) (West 1983).  On first reading, this 
appears internally inconsistent.  We have reconciled its two 
sentences by construing them to mean "agreements to indemnify or 
  
hold harmless are enforceable between the parties but not against 
the government."  Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex 
Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S 1029 
(1989); see also United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1433 
(10th Cir. 1993) (Under section 9607(e)(1) "responsible parties 
may not altogether transfer their CERCLA liability, [but] they 
have the right to obtain indemnification for that liability.") 
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  As the district 
court recognized in Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 801 
F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.J. 1992): 
 Because § 9607(e)(1) renders ineffective any 
attempt to completely "transfer" liability, 
the most a party can do to limit its 
liability under CERCLA is to obtain from 
another an agreement "to insure, hold 
harmless, or indemnify" it from any 
liabilities established against it. 
 
 
Id. at 1317 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1)). 
 Thus, Beazer could have lawfully agreed to indemnify 
Mead for its CERCLA liability or, conversely, Mead could have 
lawfully agreed to indemnify Beazer.  The issue is whether either 
did so.  The Agreement the parties rely on was executed before 
CERCLA was enacted.  Therefore, we must, at the outset, resolve 
the preliminary issue of whether a contract of indemnity that 
predates CERCLA can be construed to include indemnity against 
CERCLA liability.  This is a question of first impression in this 
Court. 
 Other courts that have analyzed pre-CERCLA indemnity 
provisions have uniformly held that a pre-CERCLA agreement can 
  
require one party to indemnify another against CERCLA liability. 
See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 
F.3d 321, 327 (7th Cir. 1994); Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1317-
18; Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 
124, 132 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 
F. Supp. 345, 356-58 (D.N.J. 1991).  We find the reasoning of 
these courts persuasive.  Accordingly, we hold that a pre-CERCLA 
agreement can require an indemnitor to hold the indemnitee 
harmless from CERCLA liability. 
 Nevertheless, not all pre-CERCLA promises to indemnify 
cover CERCLA liability.  We must look to see whether an 
indemnification provision is either specific enough to include 
CERCLA liability or general enough to include any and all 
environmental liability which would, naturally, include 
subsequent CERCLA claims.  The first step in this inquiry is to 
determine what law applies to the construction or interpretation 
of contractual provisions that affect responsibilities Congress 
has imposed on us in statutes enacted to enforce this nation's 
strong commitment to a clean, safe and attractive environment.  
We now turn to this issue, also one of first impression in this 
Court. 
 
 A. 
 In deciding what law to apply to determine whether 
Paragraphs 4(c) and 8(a) establish an obligation for Beazer to 
indemnify Mead against CERCLA liability or Mead to indemnify 
Beazer, the magistrate judge looked first to the law the parties 
  
chose in Paragraph 13(k)(1) of the Agreement.  It provides that 
Alabama law will govern.1  Seeing "no reason to frustrate the 
obvious and expressed intent of the parties," the magistrate 
judge said he would apply Alabama law to decide whether the 
Agreement's indemnity provisions were clear enough to require 
Beazer to hold Mead harmless against CERCLA liability at the 
site.  Magistrate Judge's Report at 9. 
 Finding no Alabama law directly on point, the 
magistrate judge took a cue from the holdings of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey that pre-
CERCLA agreements may cover CERCLA liability if such agreements 
are "worded broadly enough to encompass any and all liabilities, 
or if environmental liability is clearly referred to in the 
agreement."  Id. at 9-10 (citing Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 
1318; Purolator Prods. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 132; Mobay Corp., 
761 F. Supp. at 356; Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil Inc., 696 
F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988)).  After concluding that Alabama law 
on the meaning of contracts was not inconsistent with this 
developing standard of federal common law, the magistrate judge 
saw no impediment to interpreting the Agreement under Alabama 
contract law.  Nevertheless, he pointed out that construction or 
interpretation of a pre-CERCLA indemnity clause's effect on 
CERCLA liability might "be an issue best determined by a uniform 
                     
1
.  The paragraph states, "Each of the parties elects that this 
Purchase Agreement shall be governed, construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Alabama."  App. at 44-
45. 
  
federal rule . . . and that the federal case law establishing the 
standard under CERCLA may override any inconsistent state law in 
this respect."  Id. at 10 n.2. 
 The first question that we should ask is whether the 
national interest in uniform application of federal statutory law 
requires federal courts to develop a federal common law to 
preclude willy-nilly use of various state law principles in 
interpreting or construing indemnification provisions that affect 
liabilities under CERCLA.  Cf. O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2052-55 (1994). 
 Generally, federal law governs the validity of an 
agreement releasing a cause of action arising under federal law; 
see Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 
361 (1952), but the construction or interpretation of a private 
contract is generally thought to be a question of state law.  
Accordingly, most courts have recognized that imposition of 
CERCLA liability on a successor corporation is a question of 
federal law.  See, e.g., John S. Boyd, Co. v. Boston Gas. Co., 
992 F.2d 401, 406 (1st Cir. 1993); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, 
Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir. 1986); HRW Sys., Inc. v. 
Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318 326-28 (D. Md. 1993); 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 
F. Supp. 1266, 1267-68 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
 Nevertheless, all of the courts of appeals that have 
considered developing a federal rule of decision appear to have 
decided it is better to look to state law in interpreting or 
  
construing a contract's indemnification provisions vis-á-vis 
CERCLA.2 
 In John S. Boyd Co., the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit looked to the Massachusetts law of 
contracts to apportion CERCLA liability among contracting parties 
inter se.  In construing the parties' written agreement, it said, 
"state contract law . . . provide[s] the substantive rule, so 
long as it is not hostile to the federal interests animating 
CERCLA."  John S. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 406 (citations omitted); 
Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1433 n.2 ("Because the government's 
interests are unaffected by the allocation of liability between 
jointly and severally liable parties, we easily conclude that a 
uniform federal rule is unnecessary and that state law will 
govern the indemnification clauses."); see also O'Melveny, 114 
S. Ct. at 2055 ("Our cases uniformly require the existence of [a 
                     
2
.  See John S. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 406 (incorporating state 
law into federal law to construe an agreement pertaining to 
CERCLA liability); Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 5 
F.3d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1993) (state law supplies the principles 
that govern the construction or interpretation of indemnification 
clause applicable to CERCLA liability); Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1433 
& n.2; Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1458, 1460 (holding that federal 
courts should look to applicable state law to decide the validity 
of releases of claims under CERCLA); see also City of Phoenix, 
Az. v. Garbage Servs. Co., 827 F. Supp. 600, 602-03 (D. Ariz. 
1993) ("When developing federal common law, the court must decide 
whether to fashion a nationally uniform federal rule, or 
incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision. . . .  The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken both approaches when 
filling in the gaps left by CERCLA, depending on the context.") 
(citations omitted); cf. HRW Sys. Inc., 823 F. Supp. at 328 
(adopting federal "continuity of enterprise test endorsed by 
Fourth Circuit rather than state law to determination of 
corporate successor liability); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel., 814 
F. Supp. at 1268 (same). 
  
significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and 
the use of state law] as a precondition for recognition of a 
federal rule of decision."). 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has analyzed the issue of choosing state or federal 
common law to determine whether private indemnification 
agreements cover CERCLA liability in depth.  See Mardan Corp., 
804 F.2d at 1458-60.  In Mardan Corp., the government, in an 
amicus brief, argued for state law to provide the substance of 
the decision rule.  It said that "whether and when agreements 
between private 'responsible parties' can settle disputes over 
contribution rights under [CERCLA]" did not require the 
development of a uniform federal rule.  Id. at 1458.  The court 
of appeals stated: 
 [S]ection [9607(e)(1)] expressly preserves 
agreements to insure, to hold harmless, or to 
indemnify a party held liable under [CERCLA].  
Absent CERCLA, these contracts would be 
interpreted under state law.  By preserving 
such agreements, Congress seems to have 
expressed an intent to preserve the 
associated body of state law under which 
agreements between private parties would 
normally be interpreted.  Certainly federal 
courts need not fashion federal common law to 
interpret every settlement of liability that 
arises under federal statutes. 
 
 
Id. 
 Because Congress's intent to require a federal rule of 
decision was "not entirely clear," the court of appeals 
considered whether the policies Congress sought to advance by 
  
enacting CERCLA required a uniform federal standard for the 
interpretation and construction of indemnity clauses.  For 
guidance it looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).  Id.  Kimbell 
Foods set out the factors courts should use to determine when a 
uniform federal rule is needed to decide federal claims based on 
federal statutes when Congress has not made clear its intent on 
what law should supply a rule of decision.  See Kimbell Foods, 
440 U.S. at 728-29.  They are: 
 (1) whether the issue requires "a nationally 
uniform body of law"; (2) "whether 
application of state law would frustrate 
specific objectives of the federal programs"; 
and (3) whether "application of a federal 
rule would disrupt commercial relationships 
predicated on state law." 
 
 
Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1458 (citing Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 
728-29).  The court of appeals in Mardan Corp. applied Kimbell 
Foods and concluded there was no need for a federal common law 
standard.  It stated: 
  First, we find no reason to think that 
the issue requires a uniform body of law.  
Commercial enterprises selling their assets 
or insuring themselves will normally look to 
state law to interpret their indemnification 
provisions, which will generally indemnify 
the enterprises against a whole host of 
possible liabilities.  Disuniformity does not 
seem to impose any particular burden. . . . 
 
  Second, the application of state law to 
interpret such releases will not frustrate 
the objectives of CERCLA.  Contractual 
arrangements apportioning CERCLA liabilities 
between private "responsible parties" are 
essentially tangential to the enforcement of 
CERCLA's liability provisions.  Such 
  
agreements cannot alter or excuse the 
underlying liability, but can only change who 
ultimately pays that liability. . . . 
 
 *  *  * 
 
  Finally, we are convinced that 
application of a federal rule . . . would 
disrupt commercial relationships predicated 
on state law. . . .  Creating a federal rule 
to govern CERCLA releases would introduce 
confusion and uncertainty into these 
commercial relationships in two respects.  
One, buyers and sellers would face greater 
confusion about which body of law to turn to.  
Two, the creation of a federal rule, as 
opposed to incorporating a ready-made and 
fully fleshed out body of state law, would, 
during the development of that federal rule, 
leave parties very uncertain about what rule 
governed CERCLA releases. . . . 
 
 
Id. at 1458-60. 
 Judge Reinhardt, in a dissent in Mardan Corp., thought 
that a uniform federal rule should be applied to determine 
whether any particular agreement indemnified against CERCLA 
liability.  Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1463 (Reinhardt, J. 
dissenting).  Citing cases that adopted uniform federal rules to 
determine liability under section 9607 and the legislative 
history of that section stressing the need for "'a uniform rule 
of law . . . to discourage business[es] dealing in hazardous 
substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient 
laws,'" Judge Reinhardt reasoned that "a uniform federal rule 
regarding releases from CERCLA liability serves Congress' goals 
in the same manner that a uniform rule regarding liability does."  
Id. at 1464 (citing 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20, 6132 (1980) and 
  
quoting 126 Cong. Rec. H11787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement 
of Representative Florio, CERCLA House sponsor) (alteration in 
original)).  But see id. at 1459-60 (majority opinion) (arguing 
that parties are still fully liable to the government regardless 
of applicable law and concluding that adoption of state law does 
not conflict with congressional purpose underlying CERCLA). 
 Though this Court has yet to consider what law should 
govern the construction or interpretation of any particular 
indemnity provision on the apportionment of CERCLA liability 
among contracting parties, we have adopted a federal common law 
standard in other environmental contexts.3  In Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., we stressed the need for 
uniform standards if CERCLA is to be effective and indicated that 
a district court considering successor liability under CERCLA 
should look to "[t]he general doctrine of successor liability in 
operation in most states . . . rather than the excessively narrow 
statutes which might apply in only a few states."  Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 92.  We reasoned if we refused to 
apply uniform federal standards to regulate CERCLA liability, 
"CERCLA aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party's choice 
to arrange a merger or consolidation under the laws of particular 
states which unduly restrict successor liability."  Id.  In 
Lansford-Coaldale Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 
                     
3
.  It is perhaps material to note that these standards do not 
spring full formed and grown from the heads of federal judges as 
Athena did from Zeus nor does any Delphic oracle whisper 
uniformly in each judge's ear.  See Manfred Lurker, Dictionary of 
Gods & Goddesses, Devils & Demons 44-45 (1987) 
  
(3d Cir. 1993), we also expressed a preference for uniform 
federal standards to govern CERCLA liability.  We held that 
"given the federal interest in uniformity in the application of 
CERCLA, it is federal common law, and not state law, which 
governs when corporate veil-piercing is justified under CERCLA."  
Id. at 1225 (citations omitted). 
 None of our cases, however, deal with the need for a 
federal standard in interpreting or construing contracts to 
indemnify and our sister courts of appeals have uniformly 
selected state law.  See supra note 2.  Fortunately we see no 
need to create a circuit conflict and will join the other courts 
of appeals that look to the law of a particular state concerning 
the construction or interpretation of contracts of indemnity to 
determine whether a particular indemnification provision covers 
CERCLA liability.  We thus endorse the majority's reasoning and 
application of the Kimbell Foods test in Mardan Corp. 
 Moreover, we see support for this principle in the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in O'Melveny & Myers.  It teaches 
us that special federal rules are justified only in "situations 
where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal 
policy or interest and the use of state law.'"  O'Melveny & 
Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2055 (quoting Wallis v. Pan American 
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
 In O'Melveny & Myers, the Supreme Court considered 
whether federal or state decisional law should govern the 
question of imputation of knowledge in a suit where the FDIC sued 
in its capacity as receiver for a federally insured bank that had 
  
failed.  The FDIC argued that Kimbell Foods required the district 
court to apply a uniform federal rule of decision to determine 
FDIC's rights because "federal law governs questions involving 
the rights of the United States under nationwide federal 
programs."  O'Melveny & Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2053 (quoting 
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726).  The Supreme Court first stated, 
"[T]he FDIC is not the United States, and even if it were we 
would be begging the question to assume that it was asserting its 
own rights rather than, as receiver, the rights of [the failed 
bank.]"  Id. (emphasis added).  It went on to note, "The rules of 
decision at issue here do not govern the primary conduct of the 
United States or any of its agents or contractors, but affect 
only the FDIC's rights and liabilities, as receiver, with respect 
to primary conduct on the part of private actors that has already 
occurred."  Id. at 3055 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court then 
held that the issue of imputed knowledge in bank receivership 
cases "is not one of those extraordinary cases in which the 
judicial creation of a federal rule of decision is warranted."  
Id. at 2056. 
 How Beazer and Mead apportion their CERCLA liability 
among themselves does not affect the primary duty they owe the 
United States to clean up the poisons left to befoul the site 
both used.  Whether one must indemnify the other concerns instead 
the liability of private actors for acts already done, just as 
the liability of the alleged tortfeasor in O'Melveny involved the 
FDIC's right, as successor to the private right of an injured 
party, to recover for the injuries its predecessor had suffered 
  
as a result of past acts.  How much Beazer or Mead pay each other 
seems to us to have even less effect on the United States than 
did the ability of FDIC to recover for tort injuries suffered by 
the failed bank it took over.  The interpretation and 
construction of Paragraph 4(c) has no impact on either party's 
liability to the government.  See Smith Land & Improvement Corp., 
851 F.2d at 89.  On reason as well as authority, we therefore 
hold that state law should determine whether any particular 
contract of indemnity provision can be construed generally or 
broadly enough to cover one responsible party's liability to 
another. 
 
 B. 
 Having determined that state law on the interpretation 
and construction of indemnification agreements applies to this 
case, we turn to the question of what state law should be 
applied.  On that issue, we can quickly agree with the district 
court and apply Alabama law.4 
                     
4
.  We again note the magistrate judge, despite his summary 
conclusion that Alabama law controls, seems to have applied the 
standard adopted by the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  That court has used a federal standard 
to conclude that an indemnification or release provision which 
affects a party's CERCLA liability must be: 
 
 (1) a broad waiver of "all liabilities of any 
type whatsoever" . . . which would clearly 
evince the parties' broad intent to finally 
settle all present and future liability 
issues arising from the sale,; or (2) at a 
minimum, "must at least mention that one 
party is assuming [all] environmental-type 
liabilities" . . . which would clearly evince 
  
 We look to decisions of the Alabama courts and 
especially those of the Supreme Court of Alabama.  Its most 
recent decision concerning the interpretation or construction of 
indemnification provisions is Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Hall, Nos. 1921128 & 1921272, 1994 WL 107547 (Ala. April 1, 
1994).  There, it held that indemnification agreements are 
enforceable in Alabama if "'the parties knowingly, evenhandedly, 
and for valid consideration, intelligently enter into an 
agreement whereby one party agrees to indemnify against the 
indemnitee's own wrongs, [and if that agreement is] expressed in 
clear and unequivocal language."  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 1994 
WL 107547 at *3 (quoting Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart, 388 
So.2d 171, 175-76 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1081 (1981) 
(alteration in original)).  In Nationwide, Alabama's supreme 
court recognized that indemnity agreements covered only those 
incidents within their plain meaning and the court expressed a 
strong preference for this limitation.  Id. (quoting Craig 
Constr. Co. v. Hendrix, 568 So.2d 752, 757 (Ala. 1990); 
Industrial Tile, Inc., 388 So.2d at 176).  The supreme court then 
stated that "an indemnity contract purporting to indemnify for 
the consequences of the indemnitee's own negligence is 
(..continued) 
the parties' intent to settle all issues 
related to present and future environmental 
liabilities. 
 
Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1317-18 (quoting and citing Mobay 
Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 358 & n.15) (emphasis in original).  The 
magistrate judge states, however, that he used this standard 
because it is consistent with Alabama law. 
  
unambiguous, and therefore, enforceable when its language 
specifically refers to the negligence of the indemnitee. . . . 
[but that] such 'talismanic' or thaumaturgic language is not 
necessary if the requisite intent is otherwise clear."  Id. 
(citations omitted).5 
 We conclude that Alabama law requires a plain and 
unambiguous expression of intent to cover the cost of the 
liability in question.  Using this standard, we now consider 
whether Paragraph 4(c) unambiguously expresses Beazer's intent to 
indemnify Mead against CERCLA liability. 
 
 C. 
 The crux of the parties' argument concerns the district 
court's conclusion that Beazer expressly and unambiguously agreed 
to indemnify Mead for its CERCLA liability.6  They disagree as to 
whether the magistrate judge correctly applied Alabama's limiting 
standard to the Agreement.  Paragraph 4(c) reads: 
 4.  Assumption of Agreements and Liabilities 
 
 As of the Closing Date, Buyer [Beazer] shall 
assume and agree to perform: 
 
 *  *  * 
 
 c. Obligations of the Coke Plant to comply 
from and after the Closing Date with all 
                     
5
.  We do not think Alabama would apply a different rule in 
deciding whether an indemnity clause covers strict liability 
under environmental law. 
6
.  Whether an agreement is unambiguous is a question of law.  
McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Corp., 585 So. 2d 853, 855 
(Ala. 1991). 
  
of the terms and conditions of . . . any 
solid waste disposal permit, license or 
order, hereafter issued by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency 
. . . all in accordance with 
applications now pending and listed on 
Exhibit F hereto. 
 
 
App. at 23.7  Exhibit F is divided into two parts.  Beazer argues 
that Paragraph 4(c) limits its agreement to assume Mead's 
environmental liabilities to the permits mentioned in Exhibit F's 
"List of Environmental Applications and Permits."  Because 
neither part of Exhibit F mentions any solid waste permit, Beazer 
contends that Paragraph 4(c)'s promise to indemnify does not 
unambiguously cover CERCLA response costs incurred in removing 
any toxic wastes found in or around the Coke Plant. 
 After concluding that Paragraph 4(c) did not 
unambiguously rule out a promise to indemnify Mead against CERCLA 
                     
7
.  Beazer's duty to indemnify is controlled by Paragraph 8(b) of 
the Agreement which provides: 
 
  Buyer [Beazer] hereby indemnifies Mead 
against and hereby agrees to hold Mead 
harmless from and to reimburse Mead for any 
and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs 
of settlement and expenses . . . which may be 
imposed upon or incurred by Mead in 
connection with any liabilities or 
obligations of Mead and/or the Coke Plant 
assumed by Buyer under this Purchase 
Agreement. 
 
App. at 30.  The obligations imposed by Paragraph 4 constitute 
"liabilities or obligations . . . assumed by Buyer [Beazer] under 
this Purchase Agreement."  Id.  Thus, if Paragraph 4 encompasses 
CERCLA liability, Beazer would be required to indemnify Mead 
under Paragraph 8(b) of the Agreement. 
  
liability, the magistrate judge went on to consider whether it 
unambiguously required Beazer to indemnify Mead for CERCLA 
liability under the federal standard announced in Mobay Corp.  He 
acknowledged that Paragraph 4(c) was not a broad, general promise 
to indemnify Mead against all liability.  Nevertheless, he 
concluded that the text of the paragraph 
 clearly implies that, as between Beazer and 
Mead, Beazer would be responsible for any 
environmental liability arising from the 
Woodward Facility after the date of the sale.  
Even more than this implication regarding all 
environmental liability, the provision 
expressly provides that Beazer will be 
responsible for complying with orders issued 
by the EPA regarding solid waste. 
 
 
Magistrate Judge's Report at 15.  The magistrate judge construed 
Paragraph 4(c) as a promise by the buyer and its successors to 
indemnify the seller and its successors against all environmental 
liabilities associated with the Coke Plant. 
 In doing so, the magistrate judge decided that 
Paragraph 4(c)'s textual reference to future "orders" issued by 
state, local, and federal agencies contradicted the more 
restrictive interpretation of Paragraph 4(c) which Beazer would 
have us infer from the specific list of permits mentioned in 
Exhibit F Paragraph 4(c).  If Paragraph 4(c) were confined to the 
permits listed in Exhibit F, the magistrate judge reasoned that 
Paragraph 4(c)'s reference to permits, licenses, and orders 
"hereafter issued" would be meaningless.  Thus, he concluded that 
Paragraph 4(c) did include all subsequent orders, permits, and 
licenses relating to environmental liability including those 
  
required or issued under CERCLA.  Accordingly, the magistrate 
judge made the recommendation the district court accepted in 
granting summary judgment to Mead and dismissing Beazer's claim 
for contribution under CERCLA. 
 Paragraph 4(c) does expressly make Beazer responsible 
for "solid waste . . . permits issued by [EPA]," but it has as 
additional limiting language; "all in accordance with 
applications now pending and listed on Exhibit F hereto."  
Therefore, Beazer contends that the magistrate judge erred when 
he concluded that Paragraph 4(c) clearly and unambiguously 
transferred Mead's CERCLA liability to Beazer.  Beazer first 
argues that Paragraph 4(c) is no more than a "window" provision, 
common in commercial agreements for the sale of assets, which 
gives a seller interim protection against a buyer's failure to 
comply with the conditions of any existing environmental permits 
that are specifically listed, as they are here in Exhibit F.   
Thus, Beazer argues that the magistrate judge erred when he 
failed to consider the parties' basic decision to structure the 
sale as a purchase of assets.  Beazer would have us infer that 
the decision to buy and sell assets was mutually agreed on for 
the express purpose of limiting the purchaser's liability.  We 
think Beazer's argument that purchasers under asset purchase 
agreements normally assume only those debts, obligations, and 
liabilities of the seller that are expressly identified in the 
agreement is plausible and that the district court's holding that 
Beazer must indemnify Mead would be inconsistent with that 
purpose.  Nevertheless, we have been unable to find any evidence 
  
in this record that would unambiguously confirm that 
interpretation, and the text of Paragraph 4(c) is at least 
arguably to the contrary.  Cf. Watts v. TI, Inc., 561 So.2d 1057, 
1059-60 (Ala. 1990).  Therefore, we conclude that Beazer's 
argument about the nature and purpose of framing a transfer of a 
business enterprise as a sale of assets begs the question on 
Paragraph 4(c)'s meaning. 
 Beazer's argument that the language of Paragraph 4(c) 
is not clear enough to transfer Mead's CERCLA liability to Beazer 
under Alabama law is more telling.  We conclude Paragraph 4(c) is 
ambiguous under the principles of Alabama law that guides 
determinations of contracts.  See Reeves Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v. 
First Amfed Corp., 507 So. 2d 184, 186 (Ala. 1992) ("An 
instrument is unambiguous if only one reasonable meaning clearly 
emerges.") (quoting Vainrib v. Downey, 565 So. 2d 647, 648 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1990).  The provision is subject to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, and it is not plain enough to be 
construed as an unambiguous promise by Beazer to indemnify Mead 
against all environmental liability associated with the site of 
the Coke Plant, including liability without fault under laws like 
CERCLA, yet to be passed.  Therefore, it does not square with the 
principle of Alabama law that promises to indemnify are limited 
to subjects plainly expressed. 
 Moreover, cases outside Alabama which have held a 
release or indemnification provision covers CERCLA liability have 
all involved indemnity clauses with much broader and more 
inclusive language than here.  See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 
  
14 F.3d at 326-27; Olin Corp., 5 F.3d at 12-13; Hardage, 985 F.2d 
at 1434; Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 973 F.2d 1296, 1300 (6th Cir. 
1992); Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1461-62.   The Olin Corp. case 
provides one recent example.8  The court of appeals held that 
                     
8
.  The sale agreement in Olin Corp. originally provided: 
 
 [The buyer] hereby assumes and agrees to be 
responsible for and to pay, perform, 
discharge and indemnify [the seller] against, 
all liabilities (absolute or contingent), 
obligations and indebtedness of [the seller] 
related to the Aluminum Assets . . . as they 
exist on the Effective Time or arise 
thereafter with respect to actions or 
failures to act occurring prior to the 
Effective Time. 
 
Olin Corp., 5 F.3d 12-13.  A later agreement in Olin Corp. 
stated: 
 
 In consideration of the payment on this date 
by [the seller] to [the buyer] of $3,700,000 
. . . [the buyer] hereby releases and settles 
all claims of any nature which [it] now has 
or hereafter could have against [the seller] 
. . . whether or not previously asserted, 
under or arising out of the Purchase 
Agreement . . ., or the transactions 
contemplated thereby. 
 
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). 
 
    In the Kerr-McGee case the indemnification clause read: 
 
 [The purchaser] expressly agrees to indemnify 
and to defend and hold [plaintiff's 
predecessor Moss-American], its officers, 
employees, and agents, free and harmless from 
and against any and all claims, damages, 
judgments, fines, penalties, assessments, 
losses, expenses, including interest, court 
costs and attorney fees, however the same may 
be caused, arising out of or resulting from, 
directly or indirectly, the following: (a) 
the purchase, dismantling or sale of the 
  
this provision evidenced a "clear and unmistakable intent" to 
transfer the seller's environmental liability to the buyer, even 
future and unknown liability.  Olin Corp., 5 F.3d at 15-16. 
 The court of appeals held:  
 In no uncertain terms, [the purchaser] agreed 
to assume the liability for losses resulting 
from "the maintenance of any . . . claim 
. . . concerning pollution or nuisance 
. . . ."  The indemnity provision covers all 
pollution and nuisance claims without 
limitation . . . . [and makes the purchaser] 
responsible for any liability imposed . . . 
under CERCLA. 
 
 
Id. at 327 (footnote omitted). 
 The contradictory terms and references of this 
Agreement leave us with no firm conclusion as to the clear and 
unmistakable intent of the parties.  Under applicable principles 
of Alabama law, the parties failed to express the intent to 
indemnify with the requisite clarity.  We hold, therefore, that 
Paragraph 4(c) is not specific enough to impose on Beazer a duty 
to indemnify Mead for their CERCLA response costs. 
(..continued) 
personal property and real property by [the 
purchaser]; (b) the maintenance of any 
action, claim or order concerning pollution 
or nuisance; and (c) the use by [the 
purchaser] or its employees or agents of the 
personal property and real property. 
 
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 14 F.3d at 326-27 (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted).  See also John S. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 403-
04 (construing a provision stating that "[the successor 
corporation] agreed to assume 'all the duties and liabilities of 
[its predecessor] related to [the] gas business'" and that "[the 
successor corporation] agreed to 'indemnify and save harmless 
[the predecessor corporation] from any duty or liability with 
respect to the gas business."). 
  
 
 D. 
 Because Paragraphs 4(c) and 8 refer circuitously to 
each other, it follows therefore that neither Paragraph 4(c) nor 
Paragraph 8 expressly require either party to indemnify the 
other.9  Accordingly, our earlier analysis requires us to reject 
Beazer's argument that Paragraph 4(c) was intended to limit 
Beazer's assumption of liabilities to those expressly listed in 
Exhibit F, and that therefore because CERCLA is not a listed 
obligation Mead must indemnify Beazer under Paragraph 8(a).  
Beazer relies on the grammatical rule of the last antecedent to 
assert that the language "all in accordance with . . . Exhibit F" 
is a limitation on the preceding reference to "solid waste 
disposal . . . order" in support of its argument that the 
magistrate judge's construction of Paragraph 4(c)'s phrase "all 
in accordance with" Exhibit F to mean "which includes" Exhibit F 
must fail.  The phrase "all in accordance with" can be 
interpreted as Beazer would have it, but it does not compel that 
construction.  Beazer's contention that the magistrate judge 
erred when he concluded the limitation of Paragraph 4(c) to the 
permits expressly listed in Exhibit F would leave the words 
                     
9
.  Mead's duty to indemnify Beazer is set forth in Paragraph 
8(a) of the Agreement.  It is quoted in full supra, Part I, 
typescript at 6.  It requires Mead, the seller, to indemnify 
Beazer, the buyer, against all liabilities other than those 
"expressly assumed by the Buyer."  Paragraph 8(b), quoted supra 
in note 7, is its mirror image.  It requires Beazer, the buyer, 
to indemnify Mead, the seller, against all liabilities "assumed 
by Buyer." 
  
"hereafter issued" without meaning does not persuade us.  As we 
have already explained, its argument that these words merely 
reflect an intent to protect the seller during a transition 
period immediately following the transfer of assets to the buyer 
fails to shine through the murky text of Paragraph 4(c).  
Beazer's suggested interpretation of the words "hereafter issued" 
as limited to permits or licenses that might result from the 
pending applications is again plausible, but not so plain as to 
justify its construction under the Alabama rule that indemnity 
provisions must be strictly construed and limited to their plain 
meaning. 
 
 E. 
 Paragraph 4(c) does not clearly state that Beazer has 
agreed to assume all liability for toxic wastes under present or 
future laws protecting the environment.  Though the phrase in 
Paragraph 4(c), "hereafter issued," appears to look to the 
future, the phrase "all in accordance with" appears to limit the 
buyer's environmental liability to orders, permits and licenses 
that are listed in the exhibit referenced.  Accordingly, nothing 
in this agreement demonstrates a clear and unambiguous intent to 
transfer all CERCLA liability to Beazer. 
 Our refusal to construe Paragraph 4(c) as a clear 
promise by Beazer to indemnify Mead against CERCLA response costs 
leaves both Beazer and Mead responsible for their fair share of 
the cleanup costs associated with the Coke Plant.  That result 
reinforces CERCLA policy.  "Congress enacted CERCLA, a complex 
  
piece of legislation . . .  to force polluters to pay for costs 
associated with remedying their pollution."  United States v. 
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992).  Thus, we 
will reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Mead and remand this case for further proceedings on 
Beazer's contribution claim.10 
 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
                     
10
.  Section 9613(f) provides, in relevant part: 
 
  Any person may seek contribution from 
any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under section 9607(a) of this title 
. . . .  In resolving contribution claims, 
the court may allocate response costs among 
liable parties using such equitable factors 
as the court determines are appropriate. 
 
 *  *  * 
 
  A person who has resolved its liability 
to the United States or a State for some or 
all of a response action or for some or all 
of the costs of such action in an 
administrative or judicially approved 
settlement may seek contribution from any 
person who is not party to a settlement 
. . . . 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(1), (3)(B) (West Supp. 1994).  The 
magistrate judge determined that Mead was a "responsible party" 
for purposes of CERCLA liability.  It declined, however, to 
apportion the response costs or reach Mead's or Beazer's 
contribution claims under section 9613(f) because it found that 
Beazer had agreed to indemnify Mead for all CERCLA liability 
under Paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement.  On remand, the trial 
court will have to revisit the parties' contribution claims and 
correspondingly apportion liability for the attendant CERCLA 
response costs. 
  
 The order of the district court granting summary 
judgment on Mead' counterclaim and the order dismissing Beazer's 
claim for contribution will be reversed and the case will be 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
